Atomic states are rigorously characterized by the total orbital angular momentum and the total spin angular momentum, but chemists persist in the use of electron configurations based on one-electron quantum numbers and simplified rules for predicting ground state configurations. This practice is defended against two lines of criticism, and its use in teaching chemistry is encouraged with the claim that the inductive approach of Mendeleev and the deductive approach initiated by Schrödinger compose the consummate example of that interaction of empirical (...) and rational epistemologies that defines how chemists think. (shrink)

Aversive experiences have been thought to provoke or exacerbate clinical depression. The present review provides a brief survey of the stress-depression literature and suggests that the effects of stressful experiences on affective state may be related to depletion of several neurotransmitters, including norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin. A major element in determining the neurochemical changes is the organism's ability to cope with the aversive stimuli through behavioral means. Aversive experiences give rise to behavioral attempts to cope with the stressor, coupled with (...) increased utilization and synthesis of brain amines to contend with environmental demands. When behavioral coping is possible, neurochemical systems are not overly taxed, and behavioral pathology will not ensue. However, when there can be no behavioral control over the stressful stimuli, or when the aversive experience is perceived as uncontrollable, increased emphasis is placed on coping through endogenous neurochemical mechanisms. Amine utilization increases appreciably and may exceed synthesis, resulting in a net reduction of amine stores, which in turn promotes or exacerbates affective disorder. The processes governing the depletions may be subject to sensitization or conditioning, such that exposure to traumatic experiences may have long-term repercussions when the organism subsequently encounters related stressful stimuli. With continued uncontrollable stimulation, adaptation occurs in the form of increased activity of synthetic enzymes, and levels of amines approach basal values. It is suggested that either the initial amine depletion provoked by aversive experiences or a dysfunction of the adaptive processes, resulting in persistent amine depletion, contributes to behavioral depression. Aside from the contribution of behavioral coping, several organismic, experiential, and environmental variables will influence the effects of aversive experiences on neurochemical activity, and may thus influence vulnerability to depression. (shrink)

Computational modeling has long been one of the traditional pillars of cognitive science. Unfortunately, the computer models of cognition being developed today have not kept up with the enormous changes that have taken place in computer technology and, especially, in human-computer interfaces. For all intents and purposes, modeling is still done today as it was 25, or even 35, years ago. Everyone still programs in his or her own favorite programming language, source code is rarely made available, accessibility of models (...) to non-programming researchers is essentially non-existent, and even for other modelers, the profusion of source code in a multitude of programming languages, written without programming guidelines, makes it almost impossible to access, check, explore, re-use, or continue to develop. It is high time to change this situation, especially since the tools are now readily available to do so. We propose that the modeling community adopt three simple guidelines that would ensure that computational models would be accessible to the broad range of researchers in cognitive science. We further emphasize the pivotal role that journal editors must play in making computational models accessible to readers of their journals. (shrink)

A paediatric clinical trial conducted in a developing country is likely to encounter conditions or illnesses in participants unrelated to the study. Since local healthcare resources may be inadequate to meet these needs, research clinicians may face the dilemma of deciding when to provide ancillary care and to what extent. The authors propose a model for identifying ancillary care obligations that draws on assessments of urgency, the capacity of the local healthcare infrastructure and the capacity of the research infrastructure. The (...) model lends itself to a decision tree that can be adapted to the local context and resources so as to provide procedural guidance. This approach can help in planning and establishing organisational policies that govern the provision of ancillary care. (shrink)

Determining whether a research risk meets or exceeds a regulatory standard of risk acceptability is difficult. Recently a framework called the systematic evaluation of research risks (SERR) has been proposed as a method of comparing research risks with predetermined standards of acceptability. SERR purports to offer a systematic and largely determinate (definite) way to compare risks and say whether a specific research risk falls below or above an acknowledged standard of acceptable risk. Here the authors review some philosophical problems with (...) this framework, which they take to be representative of determinate approaches to risk comparison, and conclude that it should not be used in a stand-alone or determinate fashion. Instead, the authors suggest that a deliberative approach may be a more viable candidate for future development. Such an approach could be informed by methods such as SERR without being rigidly bound to them. (shrink)

Previous studies have documented the fallibility of attempts by surrogates and physicians to act in a substituted judgment capacity and predict end-of-life treatment decisions on behalf of patients. We previously reported that physicians misperceive their patients' preferences and substitute their own preferences for those of their patients with respect to four treatments: cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest, ventilator for an indefinite period of time, medical nutrition and hydration for an indefinite period of time, and hospitalization in the (...) event of pneumonia. (shrink)

Several facts about organ donation and transplantation are not in dispute: (1) there is a shortage of available organs; (2) many potential organ donors die after authorized withdrawal of life-susta...

While we agree that the frame problem, as initially stated by McCarthy and Hayes (1969), is a problem that arises because of the use of representations, we do not accept the anti-representationalist position that the way around the problem is to eliminate representations. We believe that internal representations of the external world are a necessary, perhaps even a defining feature, of higher cognition. We explore the notion of dynamically created context-dependent representations that emerge from a continual interaction between working memory, (...) external input, and long-term memory. We claim that only this kind of representation, necessary for higher cognitive abilities such as counterfactualization, will allow the combinatorial explosion inherent in the frame problem to be avoided. (shrink)

An incomplete science begets imperfect models. Nevertheless, the target article advocates for jettisoning deep-learning models with some competency in object recognition for toy models evaluated against a checklist of laboratory findings; an approach which evokes Alan Newell's 20 questions critique. We believe their approach risks incoherency and neglects the most basic test; can the model perform its intended task.

We commend Redish et al. for the progress they have made in bringing a measure of theoretical order to the processes that underlie drug addiction. However, incorporating information about situations in which drug users do not exhibit faulty decision-making into the theory would greatly enhance its generality and practical value. This commentary draws attention to the relevant human substance abuse literature.

Dynamic systems theory (DS) provides tools for exploring how simpler elements can interact to produce complex psychological configurations. It may, as Lewis demonstrates, provide means for explicating relationships between two reductionist approaches to overlapping sets of phenomena. The result is a description of psychological phenomena at a level that begins to achieve the richness we would hope to achieve in examining psychological life as it is experienced and explored in psychoanalysis.

The most striking example of Roman intervention in the affairs of mainland Greece between the Achaean and Mithridatic Wars is provided by an inscription now in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge. This stone bears the text of a letter to the city of Dyme in Achaea from a Roman proconsul named Q. Fabius Maximus, which describes his trial and sentencing of certain men of Dyme whom he had judged responsible for a recent disturbance in that city. One crux to be resolved (...) is chronological: A date of c. 115 b.c. has long been generally accepted, but recently evidence from another, still unpublished inscription has been thought to point to the year 144. Further, the letter of Fabius Maximus has long been held to exemplify the close supervision that most scholars, regardless of their position on the vexed question of Greece's formal status after 146, assume was exercised over Greece by Roman commanders in Macedonia from the time of the Achaean War. The document has also often been cited to bolster the claim that Rome pursued in second-century Greece a conscious policy of suppressing democracy or the political aspirations of the lower class. This is not, of course, the place for reassessment of these old, complex controversies. My purpose here is rather to show that interpretation of the letter of Fabius Maximus has not always been sufficiently mindful of the many obscurities of the text and, consequently, of the events that lie behind it; too often the great lacunae in our knowledge have been filled with assumptions that beg the questions that are under debate. (shrink)

First I employ bayes' theorem to give some precision to the atheologian's thesis that it is improbable that God exists given the amount of evil in the world (e). Two arguments result from this: (1) e disconfirms god's existence, And (2) e tends to disconfirm god's existence. Secondly, I evaluate these inductive arguments, Suggesting against (1) that the atheologian has abstracted from and hence failed to consider the total evidence, And against (2) that the atheologian's evidence adduced to support his (...) thesis regarding the relevant probabilities is inadequate. (shrink)

A form of Kripke's schema turns out to be equivalent to each of the following two statements from metric topology: every open subspace of a separable metric space is separable; every open subset of a separable metric space is a countable union of open balls. Thus Kripke's schema serves as a point of reference for classifying theorems of classical mathematics within Bishop-style constructive reverse mathematics.

After almost a decade, the discussion initiated by Professor Edmund Gettier's provocative paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” continues. The most recent contribution to this discussion is Professor John Turk Saunders' attempt to counter Professor Irving Thalberg's claim that a principle that Gettier employs in reaching his notorious negative conclusion is unjustified. I am moved to add to the discussion at this time because it seems to me that the principle in question is unjustified. But more fundamentally, Gettier's argument fails (...) because the putative counter-examples on which it rests fail to make their intended point. I shall discuss these claims in turn.The epistemic principle which I consider unjustified is the one which Thalberg has called the Principle of Deducibility for Justification and which Gettier formulates as follows: “for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.”. (shrink)